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RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
ARGUMENT 
THE OPINION FAILED TO CONSIDER, AND IS CONTRARY TO, 
ALL FINAL CASES IN POINT 
This case involves whether a mortgagee must account 
for use of tax reserves paid by the mortgagor. It is a case 
of first impression in Utah and is enormously important. It 
is filed as a class action, could affect more than 20,000 
mortgagors of defendant, and could involve millions of 
dollars. It will affect every mortgage lender in the state 
and may create scores of class actions in the courts of the 
state involving many, many millions of dollars. It will 
affect the availability of Utah lenders' residential mort-
gage funds by affecting their ability to sell mortgages on 
the national market. The significance of the case may have 
been obscured to the Court because the named plaintiffs' 
case involved only $13.70 per year. 
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POINT I 
PRUDENTIAL'S ARGUMENTS ON PUBLIC POLICY 
ARE ILL FOUNDED 
Prudential has devoted the major portion of its brief to 
public policy arguments. Madsen has two general responses to such 
arguments: 
First, public policy arguments should play no role in a 
summary judgment proceeding. The reason is simple. Summary judgment 
is appropriate where there is no material fact in issue and the movant 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The public policy consid-
erations raised by Prudential depend on "material facts in issue." 
If this case is to be influenced by fact-related policy considerations, 
the matter should be remanded for further factual development by a 
trial. As the record now stands, all of Prudential's policy arguments 
are merely unsupported self-serving speculation. 
Prudential's public policy arguments basically boil down to 
scare tactics. Prudential argues at length about all of the dire 
results that will follow if it loses. The argument apparently goes 
like this: 
1. The home mortgage business is important to society. 
2. The home mortgage business is complicated. 
3. The home mortgage business now works well. 
4. The courts should not tamper with an important economic 
system which seems to be working well. 
5. Madsen's potential recovery is minimal. 
6. The courts should not break up an important economic 
institution simply to provide some minimal relief to 
Madsen. 
That is a very appealing argument. The trouble is that all 
of the premises are false. For example, Prudential argues that, "the 
claim of Madsen, if successful, would adversely affect the market-
ability of mortgages in the secondary market." Brief of Respondent, 
p. 7. However, there is simply no basis in this record to conclude 
that this or any one of Prudential's other scare stories would come 
true if Madsen wins this case. 
This has been conclusively demonstrated by the recent action 
of the Bank of America (see Brief of Appellant, p.18-19). The Bank of 
America is the largest banking institution in the world. It has 
voluntarily started a program to pay a regular passbook savings rate 
of interest on mortgage escrow accounts. Not one of Prudential's 
scare stories has come true to haunt Bank of America. 
Madsen is tempted to respond in kind by theorizing for several 
pages on the beneficial economic results of requiring Prudential to pay 
interest on the impound funds. However, it is difficult to see how such 
speculation by either Madsen or Prudential is material to this lawsuit. 
POINT II 
THE INTENT OF THE PARTIES CANNOT BE CONSIDERED 
ON A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Prudential's brief is laced with arguments about what the 
parties intended. Apparently, Prudential's position is that the parties 
did not intend that interest be paid on the impound funds, and that the 
contract should be construed to follow the intent of the parties. 
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The problem is that in a contract case intent is a jury 
issue. In other words, if the contract is on its face unambiguous, 
the court can grant summary judgment as a matter of law. However, if 
the contract is ambiguous, the court may look to the intent of the 
parties as an aid in construction. However, intent is a fact issue 
and cannot be considered on a motion for summary judgment. 
B. F. Goodrich Co. v. A.T.I. Caribe, 366 F.Supp. 464 (1973 DC Del.), 
Ball v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 58 FRD.362 (1973 DC Ky.). 
POINT III 
THE DOCTRINE OF PRACTICAL CONSTRUCTION 
IS INAPPLICABLE 
Prudentialfs argument on practical construction is but 
another way for the court to determine the intent of the parties. 
Madsen has already responded to the "intent" argument in Point II 
above. However, something further needs to be said about the doctrine 
of practical construction. 
Prudential's argument is basically that no one has ever 
complained about Prudential keeping the profits on the impound funds 
— therefore the parties must have intended that Prudential could keep 
the profits. 
There is, however, one fatal flaw in the argument. It is 
true that at the time the contract was signed Madsen did not demand 
or expect profits on the impound funds. However, there is nothing in 
this record to show that Madsen was ever aware that Prudential was 
investing the funds and earning a profit on such investments. 
Certainly Prudential made no such disclosure. 
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This lawsuit arises because Prudential, without the knowledge 
or consent of Madsen, invested the impound funds and earned a profit. 
Madsen seeks a share of that profit. The doctrine of practical 
construction cannot apply here because Madsen did not know that 
Prudential had invested his money and earned a profit thereon. Madsen 
could not ask for his share of the earnings since he did not know that 
such earnings existed. 
POINT IV 
PRUDENTIAL HAS AVOIDED THE CENTRAL ISSUE 
OF A COMMON LAW PLEDGE 
Madsen1s major thesis is that Prudential holds the impound 
funds as a common law pledge. At common law the pledgee is liable 
to the pledgor for any profit or increase in the pledged property. 
Prudential attempts to dispose of this important issue in 
one short paragraph by arguing that "a pledge is the passing of a 
chattel." Brief of Respondent, p.30-31. 
However, at common law money was considered a chattel and 
could be pledged. In 2 Blackstone's Commentaries 385, it is said: 
"That things personal, by our law, not only includes 
things moveable, but also something more; the whole of 
which is comprehended under the general name of 
chattels, which, Sir Edward Coke says, is a French 
word signifying goods. 'In the grand coustumier of 
Normandy, (he observes) a chattel is described as a 
mere moveable, but at the same time is set in opposi-
tion to a fief or feud so that not only goods, but 
whatever was not a feud, were accounted chattels; and 
it is in this latter, more extended negative sense, 
that our law adopts it'. . . ." 
From Black's Law Dictionary (rev. 4th Ed.) we learn that 
fief and feud were freehold estates in land. Thus, anything which is 
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not a freehold estate in land is a chattel. 
This definition of chattel was adopted by the Supreme Court 
of the United States in In re Gay's Gold, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 358 (1871). 
There it was said, "the word chattel, in its ordinary signification, 
includes every species of property which is not real or freehold. . . ." 
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 362. 
As to money specifically, State v. Bartlett, 55 Me.200 (1867) 
held that money is a chattel. That case was a prosecution for larceny 
"of the goods and chattels" of several people. The defendant asserted 
that money was neither a good nor a chattel; therefore, the indictment 
was defective. The Maine Supreme Court, quoting from Holthouse's Law 
Dictionary, held: "Chattels personal are generally such as are 
moveable and may be carried about the person of the owner wherever he 
pleases to go; such as money . . . ." 55 Me. 210. 
Similarly, in Gockstetter v. Williams, 9 F.2d 928 (D. Mont. 
1925), which involved the insolvency of a bank, the court held that 
personal property includes money, and all things of a personal nature 
are under the heading chattel. 
Therefore, it is apparent that money was considered a 
chattel at common law. It does not seem to have ever been questioned 
that money could be pledged, the same as any other chattel. 
POINT V. 
CASE AUTHORITY CITED BY PRUDENTIAL 
IS NOT IN POINT 
Prudential cites seventeen cases in support of its position. 
Brief of Respondent, p.22-23. However, not one of those cases is in 
-5-
point. To begin with, all of those cases construe contracts 
different from the contract before this court. 
However, more importantly, not one of those cases speaks to 
the pledge theory urged by Madsen. Indeed, most of those cases turn 
on a trust theory. Madsen has not urged any trust theory in this 
court. 
In short, Prudential has cited seventeen cases which hold 
that banks do not hold impound funds in trust. Madsen agrees. 
However, Prudential has cited no cases which are in opposition to 
Madsen's pledge theory. At common law, the pledgor was required to 
account to the pledgee for any increase or profit on the property 
pledged. (See Brief of Appellant, p.5-9.) 
Prudential relies most heavily upon Zelickman v. Bell 
Federal Savings, 301 N.E.2d (111. 1973), and Sears v. Federal Savings 
& Loan Assoc., 275 N.E.2d 300 (111. App. 1971). It is true that the 
agreements in both of these cases included the word "pledge". However, 
neither of those cases analyzed the legal result of a common law 
pledge. Indeed, both Zelickman and Sears assume that the impound fund 
was a pledge. The issue in those cases was whether a trust was created 
by the "pledge". 
"We must expressly reject plaintiff's argument that 
a trust is created because of use of the word 'pledge1 
in the note. . . . This contention is a complete 
oversimplification and is based upon the most elementary 
deductive reasoning. The syllogism is: Every pledge is 
a trust. This note contains a pledge. Therefore this 
note is a trust. However, the major premise is completely 
invalid. Every pledge is not a trust. Sears v. Federal 
Savings & Loan Assoc., 275 N.E.2d 300 (111. App. 1971)." 
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It should also be remembered that Madsen's appeal deals 
with a new and unsettled area of the law. Prudential has correctly 
pointed to a number of cases dealing with related issues or different 
fact situations. However, in such a new and unsettled area of the 
law, this court should look with caution upon the precedential value 
of a handful of cases from foreign jurisdictions. 
POINT VI 
THIS IS A JUDICIAL AND NOT A 
LEGISLATIVE PROBLEM 
Prudential has made the argument that this dispute ought 
to be left to the legislature. Prudential cites no authority for 
that novel argument. Perhaps Prudential believes that the issues are 
too difficult or too important for this court to adjudicate. 
Madsen has presented a contract issue to this court. From 
time immemorial, courts have construed contracts. This contract case 
is clearly a matter for judicial adjudication. Ross v. Oregon, 227 
U.S. 150, 57 L.Ed. 458, 33 S.Ct. 220. 
CONCLUSION 
The payment by Madsen of impound funds to Prudential is a 
common law pledge. At common law the pledgee is entitled to any 
increase or profit arising out of the pledged property. Prudential 
chose the word "pledge". Prudential accepted the pledge. Then, 
without the knowledge or consent of Madsen, Prudential invested the 
pledge and earned a profit. On principles of law and justice as old 
as civilization, Madsen is entitled to the increase in the value of 
his pledge. 
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